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Traffic congestion in central business districts has been one of
the most acute post-war problems of urban communities. De-
centralization of business districts has wrought very marked re-
ductions in assessed valuation of property in central business dis-
tricts, and shrinkage in tax base, of many cities.' Ownership and
operation of off-street parking facilities by local government units
is one of the most highly recommended attacks upon the problem.
In 1948 at least 492 American cities of over 5,000 population were
operating parking lots or garages.2
Ohio cities have been slow to undertake a venture of this type,
because there have been grave doubts whether the cities might
constitutionally be authorized to do so. The Ohio Supreme Court
in 1936 held that the Municipal Auditorium Garage in Cleveland
was being operated in competition with private enterprise and not
for a public purpose. Further operation of the garage was enjoined
upon the ground that tax monies were being used to conduct a
private business. 3 The opinion indicates that private cars could be
parked in the garage and a charge collected when public meetings
were held in the Auditorium.
The Ohio Constitution grants to municipal corporations the
home-rule power to issue mortgage revenue bonds without limi-
tation to finance the acquisition and construction of public utilities.4
Whereas other states have brought within the definition of public
utility such things as cemeteries, 5 golf courses,6 swimming pools,7
and convention halls,8 Ohio courts have given a narrower, more
traditional meaning to the term public utility.9 Whether the utility
theory could be sufficiently fortified by functionally tying munici-
' From 1930 to 1946 the assessed valuation in the central business district
in Detroit has dropped $200,000,000. Yocum and Whipple, Municipal Provisions
of Parking Facilities- State Laws and City Projects, Bureau of Business
Research, The Ohio State University, Research Monograph No. 44, p. 2 n.
(1946).
Mumiic r Yns BooK 1949 (International City Mgrs. Ass'n) 440.
3 City of Cleveland v. Ruple, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N. E. 507 (1936).
4 OHIo CONsT. Art. XVflI, §12. See Comment, 9 OHIo ST. L. J. 141 (1948).
6 Denton v. City of SapuIpa, 78 Okla. 178, 189 Pac. 532 (1920).
6 Golfview Realty Co. v. Sioux City, 222 Iowa 433, 269 N. W. 451 (1936);
Capen v. Portland, 112 Ore. 14, 228 Pac. 105 (1924).
7 City of Belton v. Ellis, 254 S. W. 1023 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
8 Schmoldt v. Oklahoma City, 144 Okla. 208, 291 Pac. 119 (1930).
9 Comment, 9 OHIo ST. L. J. 142, 143 (1948).
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pal parking lots to a public transportation system, as by integrating
lots on the fringe of the congested downtown area with a shuttle
bus system, remains to be seen.
The 97th General Assembly provided authority for municipal
corporations to acquire property for off-street parking, and to fi-
nance such acquisitions.10 But authority to operate such parking
facilities was extremely limited. The statute appeared to require
the cities to re-sell or lease the property within two years after
acquisition."1
The 1949 legislature has provided specific authority for cities
and villages to lay out, establish, construct, maintain and operate
off-street parking facilities within the corporate limits. "Parking
facilities" is doubtless broad enough to embrace garages as well as
open lots. There is authority in the new act12 for municipalities to
acquire by purchase, gift, devise, exchange, lease or sub-lease any
existing facility or any interest in real property to be devoted to this
use.
Municipalities are authorized to exercise the power of eminent
domain, except as to real estate owned, leased or held by a public
utility or railroad, or real estate upon which off-street parking
facilities open to the general public are and have been established
for one year prior to the proposed acquisition. The latter part of
this limitation may be very important. If most vacant lots in desir-
able locations are used for parking cars, this restriction may mean
that cities and villages will be unable to acquire the more suitable
sites at all, or they will be required to pay a price set by the seller.
Municipal corporations are given power to sell, lease or sub-
lease property used for parking facilities. If, however, property
acquired under the power of eminent domain is sold or leased with-
in ten years after acquisition, the instrument of sale or lease must
contain a covenant running with the land requiring the continued
use of the property for parking purposes during the remainder of
a ten-year period from the date of acquisition by the city.
The act states that real estate acquired under provisions of the
act shall not be tax exempt.
Three methods of financing off-street parking facilities are pro-
vided by the new act.'3 Municipal corporations are given power to:
10 Omo Gmw. CODE §3939-2 (1938), repealed effective August 12, 1949.
11 Following the grant of power to sell and convey property which had
been acquired for off-street parking facilities, the statute contained these
words, "Such sale shall be made within two years after the date of acquisi-
tion ... ." rio GEN. CODE §3939-2 (1938), repealed by the new act under
discussion.
1 2 Omo GEN. CoDE §3939-2, effective August 12, 1949 (House Bill No. 234).
3 Onio GEN. CODE §3939-3, effective August 12, 1949 (House Bill No. 234).
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(a) use any moneys in the general fund, not otherwise obligated
or encumbered;
(b) issue and sell bonds pursuant to the provisions of the Uni-
form Bond Act;14 and
(c) issue and sell mortgage revenue bonds in the same manner
and under the same terms and conditions as provided in Article
XVIII, Section 12 of the Ohio Constitution. There is no express
grant of authority to pledge parking meter receipts as security for
parking facility revenue bonds. It is noteworthy that such a pledge
has been upheld in Michigan without consideration of the interest-
ing question whether the pledge, coupled with a covenant to con-
tinue to operate the meters, constituted an unconstitutional attempt
at abdication of the police power.' 5
Operating revenues of such parking facilities, after taxes and
operating expenses are paid, are to be paid into a bond-retirement
fund or sinking fund. The same disposition would be made of the
proceeds of a sale or lease.
This act is substituted in the General Code for existing Sections
3939-2 and 3939-3 of the General Code.'8
C.W.D.
14 Omo GEw. CoDE §§2293-1 et seq. (1937).
15 Parr v. Ladd, 323 Mich. 592, 36 N. W. 2d 157 (1949).
16 The act does not purport to authorize the construction and financing
of parking facilities beneath parks and squares by private enterprise under
leases from municipalities. That type of attack has been made in other states.
See Lowell v. City of Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 79 N. E. 2d 713 (1948); City and
County of San Francisco v. Linares, 16 Cal. 2d 441, 106 P. 2d 369 (1940).
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